With the popularity of P2P (Peer-to-Peer) 
Introduction
P2P is one of the most popular technologies which is developing quickly. The P2P overload is very suitable for worms propagating [1] . Recent years, P2P worms have already emerged in P2P file sharing systems like Gnutella. P2P worms exploit common vulnerabilities in member hosts of a P2P network and spread topologically in P2P network, a potential,, more effective strategy than random scanning for locating victims [2] . The particular designed P2P worms neither need to probe random IP addresses nor generate high rates of failed connections. Therefore, they could cause less abnormal behaviors leaded to more stealthy in detection.
There are three types of no-scanning worms that could influence P2P networks. Passive worms could hide themselves in malicious files and trick users into downloading and opening them. Reactive worms could only propagate with legitimate network activities. Proactive worms could automatically connect to and infect known peers via the topological information [3] . The proactive P2P worms get neighborhood information from the overlay topology to locate new targets. The structured and the unstructured are the two different architectures of decentralized P2P network topology. The structured means the P2P network topology is tightly controlled and files are placeed at specified locations, which will make subsequent queries easier to satisfy. The unstructured, like Gnutella, means that there is neither a centralized directory nor any precise control over the network topology or file placement [4] . Studies have shown that, the unstructured P2P networks, like Gnutella, demonstrate power-law distribution, especially the distribution of node degree.
The harm of P2P worms is serious while the P2P network topology is flexible. The current models of P2P worms are too easy to describe the process of worms' propagation exactly. To exploit an appropriate model can depict the characteristic of P2P worms ,show the weakness ,predict the possible threats and prevent the worm-based attacks.
In this paper, an unstructured P2P network topology is firstly built as a power law undirected graph. And then the P2P worms are modeled over the topology. Also, an analytical model is constructed to study the propagation of P2P worms from the perspective of the network regarded as a whole. In our Modeling and Analysis of the Proactive Worm in Unstructured Peer-to-Peer Network Qindong Sun, Qian Wang, Jie Ren model, infecting and infected actions are both defined for each individual peer. Lastly, the extensive simulation studies are carried out to prove our theory.
Related works
In 2005, Zhou et al formally presented the concept and the harmfulness of P2P worms. They exploited their researches based on BA model, and gave theoretical analysis of an upper bound of infected peers under their defense infrastructure. But they did not exploit a propagation model of P2P worms [2] . Jayanthkumar Kannan et al designed a worm used to implement a variety of policies aimed at circumventing existing schemes for worm propagation control, and simulated it. The result shows that a P2P worm can spread more than twice other worms, such as Slammer [5] . Wei Yu exploited generic mathematical models of worms for attacker/defender by using models of different systems. They proved that the number of newly infected peers and the average number of neighbors were demonstrated to increase exponentially. But the difference among logical topologies had not been considered [6] . Jie Ma et al defined passive P2P worm propagation model, analyzed the impact of P2P-related factors with numerical analysis approach and gave numerical results. What they focused on is not proactive P2P worm but passive P2P worm [7] . Zhang et al modeled P2P network topology as a power law undirected graph. They adopted discretetime to conduct recursive analysis and deterministic approximation to describe propagation of proactive P2P worms, and carried out extensive simulation studies [8] . Jiaqing Luo, Bin Xiao et al designed a novel worm, called DHL worm, in BT networks, which could find new victims and propagate itself by requesting a tracker to build a dynamic hit-list, and investigated the impact of each worm parameter [9] . The worm they designed is just fit for BT-like networks.
Propagation modeling
The propagation model we exploit can be described as follows. The proactive P2P worms gain the information of targets from neighborhood information list, then attack the susceptible ones of them in turn. An infected peer infects its neighbor by this way. And the newly infected peer can repeat this process to infect other more peers until there are no uninfected peers in the network. Our major focus in this paper is to study the propagation process of proactive P2P worms in unstructured P2P networks. Thus susceptible and infected are defined as the two states for P2P hosts. A susceptible host would be infected when exposed to the worms attack. So we make assumptions as follow.
(1) All peers in the topology are susceptible.
(2) Each proactive P2P worm takes one time tick to complete its infection on each one susceptible peer. The propagation time for every peer is the same. (3) The susceptible peers can be infected by more than one infected peers at the same time. (4) Infected peers which are infected at time tick i would not be infected again after that time tick. (5) The worms can only propagate within internal peers. For convenience, Table 1 lists the notations used in this paper. Number of newly infected peers at time tick i ActPij Number of active peers which infected at time tick j at time tick i ??
ActP i
Number of active peers which are susceptible at time tick i S ij The rate that one susceptible peer not infected by peers which were infected at time tick j at time tick i ' target for this peer at time tick i+1. We call it active degree for this peer in our paper. In short, for each edges of an infected peer, if the other end of the edge is susceptible, the degree correspondingly for the peer is active. ActD ij is defined to denote the number of average active degree at time tick j for peers which is infected at time tick i. Also, we define TolD i as the number of total degrees that are not clear at time tick i. That is for each end of all edges, if we cannot make sure whether it is susceptible or infected, it will be one factor of TolD i . For the peers whose neighbors are not all infected peers at time tick i, we call them the active peers at time tick i. We can deduce that TolD i is composed of two parts, one is the infected peers and the other is the susceptible peers. ActP i is used to denote the number of active peers at time tick i. Because at time tick i, the active degree of peers which infected at time tick j(j<i) is ActD ji , the total active degree for all peers infect at time tick j would be ActP j ×ActD ji . At the same time, the degree of the susceptible peers (There are ActP i susceptible peers at time tick i) is ActD i , therefore, the total active degree for all susceptible peers at time tick i is ActD i ×ActP i . The following recursive formulas can be obtained from the assumption above. 
In our model, there are N-I i-1 susceptible peers at time tick i. For each susceptible peer (e.g. peer A), it has d i neighbors at time tick i. For each neighbor of A, the rate it belongs to the peers infected at time tick j is ActD ji /TolD i . For each peer infected at time tick j, it has ActD ji susceptible neighbors at time tick i. So, at time tick i, the rate that A is not infected by those peers infected at time tick j, that is S ij , can be expressed as follow.
When ActD ji <1, it means there is less than one susceptible neighbor on average of each peer that infected at time tick j and active at time tick i. So, for a susceptible peer at time tick i, if one of its neighbors is the peer like this, it will be infected by it absolutely.
ji ji
Therefore, we can get following recursive formulas. 
On the basis of the above, following recursive formulas can be used to calculate I i and New i at time tick i. 
Simulation and analysis
We simulate our mode of proactive P2P worms in discrete-time. One infected peer could attack all neighbors of itself, and finally infect just one of its neighbors randomly at every discrete time tick t (t=1,2,3…) . The simulation consists of two parts as follow.
(1) Simulate the P2P network topology.
(2) Simulate the propagating process of proactive worms by simulating the action of each peer either infected or susceptible at every discrete time.
We are interest in I i and New i at any time tick i. In this paper, GLP power law generator [10] is used to generate power law topologies to represent unstructured P2P networks. And according to [4] , the network has 4736 peers and 13022 edges, its max degree is 136, median degree is 2 and average degree is 5.5. The other parameters include I 1 =1, α=1.4 [10] and the initial infected peers which are randomly chosen.
Simulation
We first construct the network topology according to [10] [11] . Both kinds of peers are simulated as well. In our simulation, different kinds of peers are used as the initial infected peers respectively to analyze the effect of different kinds of peers for propagation of P2P worms. We derive New i and I i by averaging the results of New i and I i from random numbers generated by 20 simulation runs .
As a function of time tick t Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the newly infected peers and total infected peers correspondingly. Both theory values derived from the mathematical model above and simulation results implemented in C language are plotted. 
Analysis
As can be seen from figures above, our propagation model of proactive P2P worms matches the simulation well, although there are little differences between simulation results and theory values. It is because of that the theory is based on the whole network and the whole propagation of P2P proactive worms. It shows the commonness of the propagation of P2P proactive worms. But the simulation is individual. It is affected by lots of factors such as the condition of the initially infected peers. From the result we simulate, we can see that at the beginning, the worms propagate slowly because there are not enough infectious agents. With the propagating going on, there are plenty of susceptible peers being infected and turning into infectious agents. As shown in the figure, between time tick 10 and time tick 15, both infectious agents and susceptible peers are sufficient; therefore, each infected peer has viable target to attack, the worms propagate fast. And then, because there are only a few peers that are susceptible in the topology, plenty of infectious agents have no targets to attack, the susceptible peers are deficient for infected peers at all, the propagation becomes slowly again. At last, the figure tends to stabilize, propagation is over.
From figure 1 and figure 2 , we can also analyze the effect of different initially degree to the propagation. We can see from the result that when the initially infected peers are ultra peers, the worms' propagation is faster than left peers. And to the max number of newly infected peers, the ultra peers' figure is also higher than another. That is because the ultra peers are the skeleton of the network; they have more neighbors than leaf peers. Therefore, they have more targets to attack and can last longer than the leaf peers. "Last longer" means that the time is longer than that of leaf peers, during which the ultra peers are active. To sum up, the threat that the worms begin with ultra peers is much bigger than leaf peers in P2P networks.
Conclusions
P2P worms constitute a deadly thread to Internet security. It is necessary for us to study P2P worm especially proactive P2P worm before it breaks out so that we can expose the weakness of P2P worm propagating and contribute to the detection and defense of P2P worms. The first critical mission is to model and simulate its propagation.
